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 Blocher and Gulati’s wonderful and challenging thought 
experiment brings to mind one of the most influential articles in legal 
scholarship, Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost.1 Coase 
famously observed that, in the absence of transaction costs, the law’s 
assignment of entitlements should have no effect on behavior. 
Whoever most values the entitlement would purchase it (if the law 
assigned it to another), or retain it (if the law already assigned the 
entitlement to that person). Thus things like property and tort rights 
should have no impact on the level of human activity, whether 
safeguarding against harm or adding value through exploitation. The 
assignment of that right should affect only wealth distribution, not 
behavior.2 
 So, Blocher and Gulati seem to say, a state’s right to territory 
similarly should be seen as an entitlement that might be exchanged for 
sufficient consideration. Why would not Coasean bargaining over 
territory lead to a Pareto-optimal world? After transaction-cost-free 
bargaining, would not alignments of territory and sovereignty resolve 
in a way that maximizes social welfare, which is to say human 
happiness? 
Copyright © 2017 Paul B. Stephan. 
        †   John C. Jeffries, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law and John V. Ray Research 
Professor, University of Virginia. 
1.  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
2.  There is, of course, a significant literature on how wealth effects may affect behavior.
See Robert D. Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 457, 457–60 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987). For present 
purposes, however, we can put that to the side. 
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 It takes great imagination and some intellectual courage to ask 
these questions, given the hidebound and conservative nature of most 
international-law scholarship. The issues are compelling, and the 
human costs of ignoring them are great. Rethinking the relationship 
between sovereignty and territory does not deny the foundations of 
international law, but rather pushes us to think about the social 
consequences, and therefore the social value, of this enterprise. 
 With Coase in mind, I want to explore how we might go about 
responding to Blocher and Gulati’s challenge. George Stigler 
notoriously obscured The Problem of Social Cost’s real thrust by 
assuming away the article’s central point, namely the proviso about no 
transaction costs.3 Hence the Coase Theorem, something that Coase 
himself saw as mostly beside the point. As Coase patiently tried to 
explain over the next fifty years, it was exactly transaction costs, 
embedded in institutional relationships, in which he was interested.4 
 Coase focused early in his scholarship on the make-or-buy 
decision, namely the choice of an economic actor to organize internal 
production of an input rather than buy it from the market.5 The fact 
that firms do make rather than buy indicates that some kinds of 
internal structures—institutional design, if you will—are superior to 
free markets. This indicates that under some conditions managed 
cooperation (such as hierarchical administration) entails lesser costs 
and greater benefits than market transactions. This seemingly obvious 
but deeply subtle insight served as the springboard for a large and 
celebrated literature on institutions as substitutes for classic market 
transactions.6 
So, Coase might respond to Blocher and Gulati, “you have a very 
interesting point, but what explains the transaction costs?” Rather than 
assuming them away, what institutional arrangements (firms, in the 
most general sense possible) might we plausibly design to minimize 
them? Ultimately, Coase would say, we desire a world where the 
 
 3.  GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 110–14 (3d ed. 1966). 
 4.  R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988). 
 5.  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 395 (1937) (“[A] firm will tend 
to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the 
costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the 
costs of organising in another firm.”). 
 6.  To focus only on the Nobel laureates, see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING (1985); Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293 (1985). 
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benefits of enhanced bargaining over territorial entitlements exceed 
the cost of creating the institutional arrangements that make 
adjustments in entitlements possible. So what institutions are we 
talking about and in what ways would creating and maintaining them 
be costly? When should sovereigns buy territory in market 
transactions, and when should institutional arrangements that 
substitute for markets make boundaries? 
I.  MARKETS FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND AGENCY COSTS 
 For those with a traditional economics bent, one begins by 
thinking of institutional arrangements as a response to agency 
problems under conditions of asymmetric information.7 Agency 
problems arise when an agent has different incentives from its 
principal, for example a desire to embezzle funds or shirk duties. 
Information asymmetry exists whenever one party (here the principal) 
cannot at a reasonable cost obtain adequate knowledge of the agent’s 
activities. With respect to territory, an agency problem that 
immediately comes to mind is the pesky relationship between people 
and their government. To the extent people live on territory, any 
disposition of that territory involves dealing with those people. The 
government that does the disposing will take the interests of those 
people into account to the extent that institutional arrangements link 
the people (the principal) to the government (their agent). 
But agency relationships are imperfect. The government might 
prefer to ignore their wishes. The people may have little or no ability 
directly to hold the government accountable (in the modern era, 
typically through voting). They may instead have only the capacity to 
impose indirect consequences (ranging from civil disobedience to 
armed resistance), an especially costly, and often wasteful, course of 
conduct. Even with accountability, information-asymmetry problems 
will ensure less-than-complete compliance of the agent with the 
principal’s interest, absent a preexisting perfect alignment of the 
interests of both found nowhere in the world as we know it. 
 This observation indicates that we should look first for sovereign 
transfers of territory in situations where the government faces few if 
any constraints regarding the preferences of the inhabitants. Old-
fashioned imperialism, where the human subjects of the imperial 
 
 7.  The classic discussion is Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
References to bonding and monitoring in particular are derived from this article. 
STEPHAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2017  3:37 PM 
54  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 66:51 
power were regarded as lacking any say in the disposition of their lives, 
seems an especially good candidate. To use the examples offered by 
Blocher and Gulati, it is no surprise that the United States was able to 
buy Louisiana from France, Florida from Spain, Alyeska from Russia, 
and the Virgin Islands from Denmark.8 The decision of the British to 
adhere to the terms of its lease of Hong Kong, resulting in a transfer of 
the territory to Chinese sovereignty without a plebiscite of the affected 
people, is a more modern instance.9 In every case, the preferences of 
the indigenous population may or may not have been aligned with the 
transacting sovereign, but we can be confident that their views did not 
matter. Their former sovereign had no interest in the preferences of 
colonized people, and the United States and China, as acquirers, gave 
no voice to the population. 
 More generally, one can observe that before democratic 
republics came onto the scene, transactions in territory were not that 
costly and relatively common. Sometimes cash-strapped sovereigns 
would settle territorial disputes for money, however their subjects felt 
about the matter. Thus Samuel Pepys refers to the “selling” of Dunkirk 
by Charles II to Louis XIV in 1662, a transaction that provoked some 
popular discontent but not enough to deter the King.10 Otherwise, 
sovereigns might acquire or lose land through ritualized and limited 
warfare that left the occupants (or at least their economic capacity) 
largely unscathed. The career of Frederick the Great serves as an 
example.11 Compared to outright sales conforming to the Alyeska 
model, Frederick’s “purchases” may seem wasteful. But one thing that 
economics teaches us is always to ask, “compared to what?” On a 
continuum between a pure market transaction and total warfare, these 
events lean toward the former. And one reason that violence and social 
disruption could be contained was that the subjects of the territorial 
transfers—the people on the ground—lacked many alternatives to 
acquiescence. They could exit—pull up stakes and emigrate to 
somewhere else in Europe or to America—but they lacked the capacity 
to impose significant costs on the rulers and had no direct voice in the 
 
 8.  Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 808 
(2017). 
 9.  Id. at 833–34. 
 10.  4 SAMUEL PEPYS, THE DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS 344 (Henry R. Wheatley ed., 1893) 
(“I am sorry to hear that the news of the selling of Dunkirk is taken so generally ill, as I find it is 
among the merchants[.]”). 
 11.  See TIM BLANNING, FREDERICK THE GREAT xxviii (2016). 
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outcome.12 Contrast the territorial adjustments achieved by Otto von 
Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian War. He changed sovereign 
boundaries, not through outright purchase but through constrained use 
of force not too different in scale from that of Frederick the Great. One 
of the “sellers,” however, was Republican France, whose nationals had 
a say in their governance.13 The running sore that Alsace-Lorraine 
became, or more precisely popular resentment in democratic republics 
(France before 1918, and Germany from 1918 to 1940, after it had 
surrendered the territory back to France) toward that territorial 
disposition, generated extremely high transaction costs in the form of 
passions that twice paved the way for total war. 
 What this comparison suggests is the existence of a tradeoff 
between low transaction costs in the transfer of territory between 
states, on the one hand, and the institutional relationship between 
governments and subjects, on the other. Relationships that correspond 
with contemporary human-rights ideals—think of the supposed human 
right to democracy14—complicate the ability of a government to make 
territorial adjustments that might maximize the joint welfare of the 
states involved. 
II.  DEMOCRACY AS A TRANSACTION COST AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
 Blocher and Gulati, to be sure, embrace this ideal of democratic 
group preferences. They want to raise the cost of territorial transfers 
by giving a say to the affected inhabitants. Under their regime, the 
United Kingdom no longer can come to an accommodation with 
Argentina to turn the Falklands into the Malvinas without the consent 
of the small local population. Home-country popular solidarity with 
the current inhabitants of the Falklands already limits what the United 
Kingdom can do, but in Blocher and Gulati’s world the United 
 
 12.  See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 4 (1970). 
 13.  To be precise, the France that entered that war was Louis Napoleon’s Empire, but the 
one that had to live with its immediate consequences was the Republic. 
 14.  For advocacy of such an international human right, see Stephen J. Schnably, Emerging 
International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 438 (2008). For skepticism, see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, 
Democracy and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1741–42 (2009). 
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Kingdom would have to clear another hurdle in the form of a local 
referendum.15 
 Blocher and Gulati see this impediment to otherwise optimal 
transactions as necessary in light of modern international law’s 
orientation toward humanity rather than sovereigns.16 What they 
overlook, however, are two institutional problems. First, it is far from 
clear that referenda are good mechanisms for uncovering democratic 
preferences. Demagoguery and fraud might subvert the meaning of the 
vote, which at best reflects a transient preference of the not-
necessarily-representative subset of the population that bothers to 
vote. One might think of the British referendum on E.U. membership 
in these terms. 
Second, even if referenda do a tolerably good job of uncovering 
group preferences, they present other problems. First, they do not fully 
reflect intensity of preferences, and thus subject passionate minorities 
to the dominion of the blasé majority. Unlike legislative institutions 
that permit logrolling and similar contracting, they treat all voters 
alike. Second, factors well studied by the field of public choice, a subset 
of political economy, indicate the possibility that assertions of local 
identity could block generally desirable transactions. 
 Let’s stay with the Falklands example. One of the main insights 
of modern public-choice scholarship is that small and homogenous 
groups face relatively lower organizing costs. This feature allows such 
groups to exploit opportunities to extract rents to the detriment of the 
general welfare.17 Falklands’ polity seems to fit perfectly. Allowing 
them to veto any deal between the United Kingdom and Argentina 
would create a very expensive entitlement. 
 
 
 15.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 8, at 817 (“Consistent with the principle of self-
determination, the population of a region would have the right to vote on whether to solicit, 
accept, or refuse governance bids from other nations.”). As John Coyle notes, the British 
government faces an audience constraint. John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market 
for Sovereign Control: A Response to Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 37, 
40–43 (2017). 
 16.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 8, at 831–32; see Anne Peters, Humanity as the   and Ω of 
Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513 (2009). 
 17.  VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 379 (Ann S. Schwier & Alfred 
N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., 1971) (1927) (“If a certain measure A is the cause of the loss 
of one franc to each of a thousand persons, and of a thousand franc gain to one individual . . . it is 
likely that, in the end, the person who is attempting to secure the thousand francs via A will be 
successful.”); see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 238–42 (2003); Anne O. Krueger, 
Government, Trade, and Economic Integration, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 109, 110–11 (1992). 
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III.  MARKET FAILURE IN DEMOCRATIC CHOICES OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 This example makes a broader point: one never can talk about 
markets without considering the possibility of market failure. The 
structure of the Falklands-United Kingdom-Argentina market has 
obvious flaws, which might point us in the direction of alternative 
approaches. Rather than assign to the indigenous population a tradable 
entitlement (here a blocking right), perhaps one should instead 
consider as a substitute some mixture of bonding and monitoring (to 
use the terminology of financial economics). 
For example, one might guarantee the indigenous inhabitants 
certain core rights, including automatic citizenship in the transferring 
country (doubtlessly coupled with subsidies to ease the adjustment). 
The transferring state also might create—and the receiving state might 
accede to—a monitoring mechanism to ensure protection of those who 
choose to remain in the transferred territory. The Treaty of Westphalia 
employed this feature, inasmuch as the signatories created a right of 
the affected sovereigns to intervene on behalf of minority co-
religionists in the territory of their adversaries.18 A treaty between 
Argentina and the United Kingdom similarly might provide the British 
with an ongoing role to look after the remaining Falkland Islanders in 
the Malvinas.  
One might imagine other structures, but these simple proposals 
should suffice for our purposes. They illustrate strategies for the 
creation of substitutes to the veto right that Blocher and Gulati would 
give to the affected population. The basic economic point is that, 
because of imperfect market structure, it makes little sense to endow 
the Falkland Islanders with an entitlement that they hypothetically 
could trade for these protections. As Coase teaches us, the transaction 
costs engendered by creation of the entitlement that Blocher and 
Gulati envision may be prohibitive. 
IV.  INSTITUTIONAL PREDICATES TO A MARKET IN SOVEREIGNTY 
 Blocher and Gulati propose not only a humanity-based right to 
veto boundary changes, but also one to force them. They propose—to 
use the terminology of Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed—to 
convert the principle of territorial integrity from a property rule into a 
 
 18.  STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 73–75, 77–83 (1999). 
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liability rule.19 Under specified circumstances and subject to not-yet-
identified institutional arrangements, local populations would have the 
power to compel sovereigns to surrender territory in return for 
compensation. Blocher and Gulati regard widespread abuse and 
exclusion of discrete population groups as a basis for an opening bid in 
a territorial adjustment process. To use the terminology of finance, 
they would endow an aggrieved minority with a call right to buy local 
sovereignty, with the strike price subject to determination by some 
mechanism. In the language of Albert Hirschman’s groundbreaking 
work, they would create stronger exit entitlements as a substitute for 
weak voice powers.20 
 The merit of the proposal turns on the design of the mechanism 
that will adjudicate such claims. The property rule-liability rule 
distinction emerged as a way of analyzing private law in societies with 
strong and effective legal institutions.21 Domestic courts in most rich 
countries can, at a relatively low cost, impose sanctions to protect 
property entitlements and assess damages to enforce liability rights. 
Where are the counterparts in international law to respected and 
effective domestic courts? The short answer is these mechanisms do 
not currently exist. One would have to construct some kind of 
institution to supervise the transfer-and-compensation mechanism. 
Many questions immediately present themselves. 
First, who will do the designing? Do affected states get a veto, as 
they would if this mechanism were to rest on treaty law? Or does an 
international body such as the United Nations Security Council get to 
make the call? May states instead design a mechanism unilaterally? 
Blocher and Gulati seem to support the involvement of one particular 
U.N. body, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But at present that 
 
 19.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
 20.  See Hirschman, supra note 12, at 129–31. 
 21.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 19, at 1089–93. Even earlier, the idea of self-
assessment of the value of property, motivated by providing a call right to the world as the 
assessed value, appeared as a mechanism for rationalizing property taxation. Arnold C. 
Harberger, Issues of Tax Reform for Latin America, in FISCAL POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN LATIN AMERICA 116–21 (Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States ed., 
1965). For development and extension of the concept, see Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation 
Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 771 (1982); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 
Property Is Another Name for Monopoly: Facilitating Efficient Bargaining with Partial Common 
Ownership of Spectrum, Corporations, and Land (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ.  
Working Paper No. 772, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818494 
[https://perma.cc/RBH4-RRS8]. 
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institution exercises jurisdiction only by consent, given in advance by 
treaty or declaration, or post hoc, once a dispute has arisen.22 Do the 
authors envision states with restive, perhaps oppressed minorities 
consenting in advance to the ICJ’s disposition of these problems? 
Under what conditions would it be plausible to expect such consent?  
Perhaps their optimism is motivated by scholarship indicating that 
the ICJ has a decent (though far from perfect) record in resolving 
territorial disputes to the satisfaction of the parties.23 The cases that 
induced this satisfaction, however, involved economically valuable but 
uninhabited offshore claims. And as the recent China-Philippines 
dispute shows, even states that agree in advance to third-party 
arbitration (here the Permanent Court of International Arbitration, 
not the ICJ, but the difference is insignificant) over unpopulated 
territory may walk away from a process that is not heading their way.24 
There is simply no evidence that states would trust the ICJ to supervise 
and set a price for secessions or could be induced to do so. 
Alternatively, states might fashion arbitration tribunals as needed. 
International law has many examples of states creating an ad hoc 
tribunal to address a dispute that already has arisen.25 States might even 
agree in advance to construct a mechanism for running ad hoc 
arbitration, perhaps along the line of the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) facility, without 
conveying any jurisdiction ex ante to the mechanism.26 The ICSID 
treaty does this: the treaty establishes an arbitral mechanism, but it 
takes a separate treaty to trigger that mechanism’s jurisdiction and the 
relevant substantive obligations. 
There is some evidence that ad hoc arbitration does a better job 
than permanent tribunals of inducing sovereigns to submit their 
 
 22.  Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 
Bevans 1179, 1186. The statement in text does not comprise the advisory-opinion jurisdiction of 
the ICJ, id. arts. 65–68, as its exercise does not produce binding judgments. 
 23.  Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1319–22 (2004). 
 24.  Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. July 12, 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%
20-%20Award.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JBY-KAZ3]. 
 25.  The United States has agreed to many of these, from the Jay Treaty’s Commission to 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.  
 26.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
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disputes to their competence and to comply with the resulting award.27 
From the perspective of states, ad hoc arbitration has the benefit, 
compared to a permanent tribunal such as the ICJ, of greater control 
over the selection of the arbiters, and thus over the range of possible 
outcomes.28 Most of our experience with this mechanism, however, 
involves claims for money damages rather than in-kind awards.29 It 
would take a leap of faith to believe that a significant number of states 
might consent to disposing of restive minorities and the land they 
occupy in this fashion. 
Perhaps instead Blocher and Gulati anticipate a nonconsensual 
means to compel states to treat with aggrieved populations with a view 
to territorial separation. The U.N. Security Council, for example, could 
impose this outcome, as long as the permanent members go along. One 
might note, however, the recent Declaration of the Russian and 
Chinese governments on the promotion of international law.30 They 
state, among other things: 
The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China fully 
support the principle of non-intervention in the internal or external 
affairs of States, and condemn as a violation of this principle any 
interference by States in the internal affairs of other States with the 
aim of forging change of legitimate governments.31 
This pronouncement underlines the obvious: neither China nor 
Russia, two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council with 
unlimited veto power, are likely to permit the creation of any 
mechanism that will arbitrate secessions, especially ones based on the 
grievances of minority populations. 
 One might respond that Russia, notwithstanding its professed 
commitment to non-intervention and sovereign integrity, has 
 
 27.  Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 51–54 (2005). 
 28.  Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Judicial Production of International Law, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 202, 209–10, 
225–26 (Alberta Fabbricotti ed., 2016). 
 29.  A rare, if not unique, instance of ad hoc arbitration that both determined international 
boundaries and ordered monetary reparations was the Eritrea-Ethiopia dispute. See generally 
Eritrea v. Ethiopia, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border Between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, 25 REPTS. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 83 (2002). 
 30.  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FED’N, THE DECLARATION OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE PROMOTION  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jun 25, 2016), http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_
publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698 [https://perma.cc/B3VR-AFCY]. 
 31.  Id. 
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cheerfully embraced secession and territorial transfers in its own favor 
in Abkhazia and Crimea. In the case of Crimea, the relevant legal 
instruments cite ethno-nationalism and human rights as justifications 
for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.32 What these examples 
show, however, is opportunistic flexibility, not some broader 
commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes concerning oppressed 
minorities. It remains inconceivable that the current Russian regime 
would ever accede to a structure in which the Chechens, for example, 
might gain advantage, any more than China would give even indirect 
support for mechanisms that might apply to Tibetans or Uighurs.  
 This leaves a potential rule of customary international law that 
states might apply on a self-judging basis, which, as institutional 
arrangements go, is the worst. It gives aggressor states an excuse to 
ignore the principle of territorial integrity when their interests so move 
them. The German Reich, we should never forget, invoked the 
protection of German populations as its rationale for invading Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Russia did the same when it absorbed 
Crimea in 2014 and has threatened to intervene in Latvia and Estonia 
for similar reasons. Self-judging intervention on behalf of supposedly 
beleaguered national minorities has a lot to answer for as a principle. 
V.  SYSTEMIC EXTERNALITIES IN MARKETS FOR SOVEREIGNTY 
 There remains another problem with the proposed liability rule, 
one that rests on a different kind of market failure. Blocher and Gulati 
begin their argument by assuming the validity of the principle of 
national self-determination outside of the decolonization process.33 In 
doing so, they link the concept of ethnic-group identity to particular 
 
 32.  Angela Di Gregorio, Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea 
on the Admission to the Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and the  
Formation of New Components Within the Russian Federation, DIPEO (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://users2.unimi.it/dirpubesteuropa/2014/03/treaty-between-the-russian-federation-and-the-
republic-of-crimea-on-the-admission-to-the-russian-federation-of-the-republic-of-crimea-and-
the-formation-of-new-components-within-the-russian-federation [https://perma.cc/72N3-CPMJ] 
(referring in the preamble to “the historic commonality of their peoples and taking account of the 
ties established between them” as well as “all peoples have an inalienable right to determine their 
political status freely and without outside interference and to implement their own economic, 
social and cultural development” and “the common will of their peoples, indissolubly linked by a 
common historic destiny”). 
  Out of perhaps an excess of caution, I should disclose that I am taking part in an 
international arbitration on behalf of Ukrainian investors in the territory absorbed by Russia. 
One should discount my references to these events accordingly. 
 33.  Blocher & Gulati, supra note 8, at 811–13. 
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international-law entitlements. In particular, their liability rule 
privileges ethnic minorities by bestowing on them a capacity to trigger 
a territorial transfer, what I have described as a call right. I assume, 
although they do not say so expressly, that the same right might extend 
to other groups identified by other means, such as religious 
commitment.34 
 The market failure here is one of externalities produced by the 
systemic effect of the transactions encouraged by the proposed 
mechanism. Put simply, I worry that the liability rule will lead to more 
ethnically or culturally concentrated states, rather than greater 
multiculturalism and ethnic pluralism within states. Ethnic or cultural 
secessionists might either carve out their own state, both reducing the 
pluralism of the state suffering the secession and concentrating the 
ethnic homogeneity of the new state, or move into a preexisting state, 
still reducing pluralism in the seceded-from state but also concentrating 
homogeneity in the seceded-to state. The Crimea-to-Russia example 
illustrates the latter phenomenon: Ukraine lost some of its ethnic-
Russian population while the Russian Federation became more 
Russian as a result of the transaction. 
These developments might produce threats to international peace 
and security that would not be limited to the parties to the sovereignty-
transfer transaction. First, the effort to achieve greater homogeneity 
threatens existing international arrangements. The German Reich’s 
efforts during the 1930s to bring all Germans within the boundaries of 
the German state remains the paramount example, but others exist. 
The partition of India at the end of the Raj produced massive loss of 
life.35 Here ethnicity was bound up with religion, but it is not clear 
which group identity did the dirty work. Perhaps murders would have 
occurred on the same scale if coexistence had been tried first, but one 
can wonder. The Balkans wars of the 1990s also illustrate the terrible 
costs of forming ethnically or culturally concentrated states out of 
multinational sovereignties. 
 
 34.  What distinguishes the Serbs from the Croats, the Irish Republicans from the Loyalists, 
Bosniaks from the Bosnian Serbs, and Shiites from Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, for example, are 
religious and cultural, rather than ethnic, differences. At earlier moments in history, such as the 
Thirty Year War, ethnic identity simply made no sense, while creedal commitments were matters 
of life and death. 
 35.  A precise number for the deaths resulting from communal violence occasioned by 
partition is deeply contested. Almost all agree that at least several hundred thousand people were 
murdered, and estimates of a million or more are not implausible. See generally PARTITION: THE 
LONG SHADOW (Urvashi Butalia ed., 2015). 
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Second, once formed, states based on ethnic identity face 
particular insecurities that can aggravate international tensions. 
Because complete ethnic, much less cultural, purity is unattainable, 
minorities typically remain within the ethnic state and serve as a source 
of dissent and anxiety. Moreover, secession normally will leave the 
oppressed group and their oppressors as contiguous states. This 
situation is fraught with the potential for future conflicts. 
One might counter this argument by asserting that ethnically or 
culturally homogenous groups provide a more supportive and secure 
environment for their members, and that states with calmer, more 
fulfilled subjects pose less of a threat to peace. In extreme cases, states 
based on homogeneity provide safe havens to populations under dire 
threat, perhaps even at risk of genocide. Allowed to live with those 
with whom they have close cultural affinities, the argument might go, 
the population of such states will find greater opportunities to flourish 
and enjoy lives free from invidious discrimination. Fulfilled at home, 
they will live comfortably with their neighbors. At least they will not 
be murdered en masse, setting off a spiral of violence. 
We are speaking here, of course, in gross generalizations. Still, the 
counterargument seems problematic, at least in many instances. First, 
it assumes that ethnic or cultural identity itself is a secure and stable 
thing, rather than a deeply contingent social construction that often 
produces deep anxiety among those seeking to cling to it. Second, it 
ignores the possibility of pacific socialization that pluralist 
communities may promote. 
Many important ethnic and cultural identities are sufficiently 
unstable to pose serious problems for those who would like to find 
them meaningful. Germans in the first half of the twentieth century 
provide an apt example: many failed to live up to the blond, blue-eyed 
ideal, not the least the Führer himself. The Nazis planned breeding 
programs to produce German prototypes who would inspire the 
German masses, who themselves mostly did not live up to the 
standard.36 Or consider the Serbs and the Croats, who claim distinct 
and hostile ethnicities even though, for some observers, only religion 
and alphabet distinguish them. Finally, recall the influence of skin tone 
as a means of social differentiation among people of color.37 The 
 
 36.  See Kjersti Ericsson, Introduction, in CHILDREN OF WORLD WAR II: THE HIDDEN 
ENEMY LEGACY 4–7 (Kjersti Ericsson & Eva Simonsen eds., 2005). 
 37.  See e.g., RONALD E. HALL, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SKIN COLOR 
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (2010). 
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human propensity to create group identity seems matched by the 
capacity to differentiate and divide. 
 The argument for ethnically or religiously homogenous states 
confuses a short-term imperative to create a refuge to forestall 
genocide with a long-term justification for sovereign boundaries. One 
may concede the necessity of the former while rejecting the latter. The 
confusion, however, is dangerous. An unfortunate tendency of 
contemporary practice is to let solutions to immediate problems 
become entrenched features of the international landscape. The right 
to trigger a sovereignty transfer that Blocher and Gulati advocate 
seems a perfect example. It runs the risk of promoting transactions that 
can generate systemic costs that could fall on those who would not be 
parties to the transaction. These externalities provide a reason to resist 
this particular proposal, however attractive the Blocher and Gulati 
project otherwise seems. 
CONCLUSION 
 This Response to Blocher and Gulati seeks to identify areas for 
further work and to put limits on some of their proposals, but not to 
stifle the fundamental ingenuity of their Article. They raise the 
Coasean question in an area where few, if any, scholars have done so. 
They seek to open up the international system to a mechanism that 
may save lives and reduce misery. They offer yet another reminder of 
the problematic nature of modern sovereignty in a world of global 
transactions and a wide range of non-national identities. All of this is 
good and useful. 
 It is not the authors’ fault that they leave implementation of 
their project for later development. Yet I worry about the 
opportunistic exploitation of a valuable concept in areas where it 
should not apply, especially as the article itself does not identify such 
limits. Russia’s absorption of Crimea comes to mind. Whatever one 
might think of this transaction, one should hope that the Russian 
Foreign Ministry does not start invoking Blocher and Gulati as 
justification for it. This Response seeks to respond in advance of such 
claims. 
 More broadly, this Response unlinks the idea of Coasean 
bargaining over sovereignty from the privileging of ethnic or religious 
identity in international law. This connection is supplementary, rather 
than fundamental, to Blocher and Gulati’s main argument. There are 
many ways to think about a market for sovereignty and the need to 
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protect local minorities without conflating these two problems. I would 
embrace their proposal but oppose this particular application. 
 
  
 
